Click inside the simplex to see solution trajectories for three different evolutionary dynamics!
Each point in the simplex represents the frequencies of three strategy-types in a large population of agents.
Trajectories within the simplex show how the population composition changes over time.
Zeeman's game is interesting because it has an interior attractor that is not an evolutionary stable strategy. It is also a game in which different evolutionary dynamics have very different basins of attraction.
By clicking inside the simplex you can see solution trajectories for the following three evolutionary dynamics:
Each agent picks another agent at random, and then imitates that agent's strategy with probability propotional to the positive difference between that agent's expected payoff and the population's average payoff.
Each agent picks a strategy at random and adopts that strategy with probability proportional to its excess payoff. A strategy's excess payoff is the positive difference between that strategy's expected payoff and the population average payoff.
Each agent picks another agent at random, and then imitates that agent's strategy with probability proportional to the positive difference between her expected payoff and the other agent's expected payoff.
Numerical integration is performed using Euler's method with step size equal to .01.